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 Abstract: This study examines savings outcomes of single mothers in Individual Development 
Accounts (IDAs), a structured savings program for the poor. Results indicate that low-income 
single mothers can save in IDAs. Results also show that participant characteristics, in general, 
have little impact on savings outcomes. Program variables such as monthly savings target and 
financial education are linked with savings. Policy implications are discussed.  
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 Background 
 
Mother-only families have increased rapidly in the past four decades, and these families are 
much more likely to live in poverty than two-parent families (Furstenberg, 1990; Garfinkel & 
McLanahan, 1986; United States Bureau of the Census, 2001). As such, previous studies have 
examined reasons for the economic hardship of single mothers, and indicated that contributing 
factors include their low earning capacity, low job opportunities in economically depressed 
areas, lack of child support, and meager public benefits (McLanahan & Booth, 1989; McLanahan 
& Sandefur, 1994; Nichols-Casebolt & Krysik, 1997; Rocha, 1997). Another important factor, 
lack of accumulation in assets, has been increasingly recognized in recent years. Studies show 
that increasing asset inequality has become much more prominent than income inequality (Oliver 
& Shapiro, 1995; Wolff, 1995). Compared to middle class and higher income Americans, low-
income single mothers save much lower portions of their income and accumulate fewer assets 
(Bernheim & Scholz, 1993; Carney & Gale, 1999). Lack of asset accumulation may not only 
contribute to the low economic status of single mothers but, more importantly, restrict their 
economic mobility (Sherraden, 1991).  
It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether low-income single mothers can save and under 
what circumstances. In this study, drawing on a general research report (Schriener et al., 2001), 
savings patterns of single mothers are examined in a structured savings program for the poor—
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). IDA programs provide matched savings to low-
income people who save for designated purposes, such as a home, post-secondary education, or 
microenterprise, that may promote their long-term well-being.  
 
Motivation 
 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) has focused 
on moving welfare recipients from welfare to work (United States Congress, 1996). State-
operated Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) has ended cash entitlements, 
established lifetime time limits on welfare receipt, and imposed strict work requirements. How to 
help welfare recipients enhance their economic self-sufficiency has, thus, been addressed in the 
policy debate. Asset-based welfare policy (Sherraden, 1988; 1991), which focuses on social and 
human capital investment in the poor, is an important line of policy development in this respect. 
The theoretical foundation of asset-based policy and IDAs highlights the importance of assets 
beyond income and consumption. Sherraden suggests that, in addition to bringing economic 
security to families, assets may have a wide range of positive personal and social effects such as 
greater future orientation and increased social influence. These effects can help the poor invest in 
self and enhance life chances. Existing empirical evidence is generally supportive of this 
argument (Scanlon & Page-Adams, 2001; Cheng, 1995; Cho, 1999; Page-Adams & Sherraden, 
1997; Rocha, 1997; Zhan & Sherraden, 2002). 
 
IDAs have been included as a state option in the 1996 federal welfare reform law. Some states 
have included IDAs as part of their state welfare reform plans and allow TANF funds to be used 
for IDAs. At present, at least 29 states have passed IDAs or related legislation to enable low-
income residents to save (Edwards & Gunn, 2002). As these programs develop, it is important to 
know if they are effective and what factors may help single mothers successfully save in these 
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 programs. Based on the institutional perspective of savings, this study examines whether single 
mothers can save in IDAs, and how various institutional and participant factors affect their 
savings.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Economic theory predicts that savings will increase with income (Deaton, 1992). Therefore, low 
savings of the poor may partially result from their limited income. However, failure of public 
policies to provide savings incentives for the poor also undermines savings efforts. Beverly and 
Sherraden (1999) posit that “institutional factors” other than income and preferences may play an 
important role in promoting savings. Specifically, they propose four institutional determinants of 
savings: institutionalized saving mechanisms (e.g., employer-provided pension plans), targeted 
financial education, attractive saving incentives (e.g., matched savings), and facilitation (e.g., 
payroll deduction). From this perspective, one of the major barriers to  savings faced by low-
income households is the lack of access to incentives or institutions that promote and subsidize 
asset accumulation (Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991; 2001). For example, the non-poor can save 
for retirement through institutionalized mechanisms with tax benefits; the poor, on the other 
hand, are much less likely to have jobs with pension benefits, their savings benefits are, thus, 
limited.  
Although further empirical evidence is needed, results from a number of studies support the 
propositions of the institutional view of savings. For example, studies found that employer-based 
financial education increased both participation rates and amount of contribution to retirement 
plans (Bayer, Bernheim & Scholz, 1996; Bernheim & Garret, 1996). Studies also indicated that 
financial education could improve financial knowledge and practices of low-income populations 
(Caskey, 2001; Clancy, Grinstein-Weiss, & Schreiner 2001; Hirad & Zorn, 2001; Shelton & Hill, 
1995). Anderson (1998) further noted that lack of knowledge was one of the important reasons 
for the underutilization of public financial services and benefits among low-income persons. 
In support of the institutional perspective of savings, studies also find that individuals save less 
due to saving disincentives. For example, researchers documented that asset limits associated 
with means-tested welfare programs served to decrease savings of participants or potential 
participants (Carney & Gale, 1999; Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994; 1995; Hurst & Ziliak, 
2001; Powers, 1998; Ziliak, 1999). These studies also indicated that the poor saved more in 
response to an increase in asset limits of these programs.  
 
Data and Methods 
 
Data and Sample 
The data for this study came from the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), which is the first 
national demonstration of IDAs for low-income households. All 14 IDA programs in ADD were 
run by 13 private, not-for-profit host organizations, which included community development 
organizations, social service agencies, credit unions, and housing organizations. These programs 
used a variety of ways to market IDAs to potential participants who were then “self-selected” to 
participate in these programs. ADD ran for four years from 1997 to 2001. As of June 30, 2000, 
2,378 participants opened an IDA in ADD (Schreiner et al., 2001). The sample for this study 
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 included 1,215 female participants who were unmarried, 18 years old or older and had at least 
one dependent child under 18 years old living in the household.  
 
Table 1 shows important characteristics of the sample in comparison to low-income single 
mothers in general. Comparison statistics were obtained through analyses of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) (interview year 2000), and the sample included single 
mothers whose household income was at or below 200 percent of the family-size adjusted 
poverty threshold. Compared to general low-income single mothers, a higher percentage of ADD 
participants had postsecondary education (59 percent vs. 30 percent) and were employed (85 
percent vs. 66 percent). Single mothers in ADD were also more likely to have a bank account (77 
percent vs. 42 percent) and less likely to have received welfare (45 percent vs. 68 percent). These 
differences may be partly due to the fact that most ADD programs target “working poor”. On the 
other hand, single mothers in ADD were younger (35 years vs. 39 years old), more likely to be 
never married (60 percent vs. 34 percent) and to be non-white (69 percent vs. 62 percent). 
Overall, these comparisons suggest that ADD has somewhat more demographically 
disadvantaged working single mothers.  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample in Comparison with Low-Income Single Mothers in 
General 
Variables ADD sample (N=1,215) NLSY Sample (N=850) 
Continuous Variables 
Age  
Number of adults 
Number of children under 18 
Mean (std. dev) 
35 (8.3) 
1.2 (0.6) 
2.1 (1.2) 
Mean (std. dev) 
39 (2.2) 
1.5 (1.3) 
2.1 (1.1) 
Categorical Variables 
Race  
White  
African American 
Others 
Percents 
 
31 
56 
13 
Percents 
 
38 
54 
 8 
Marital status  
Never married 
Divorced or separated 
Widowed 
 
60 
38 
 2 
 
34 
63 
 3 
Employment status  
Employed (full-time or part-time) 
Unemployed  
Not in labor force  
 
85 
 
 5 
10 
 
66 
 
 8 
26 
Educational status  
Less than High School 
      High School Graduates 
     Postsecondary Ed.     
 
14 
27 
59 
 
20 
50 
30 
Owner of checking and /or Savings 
account 
 
77 
 
42 
Home owner 10 30 
Receipt of AFDC/TANF 45 68 
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Measurements 
The dependent variable in this study included four measures of different aspects of savings and 
asset accumulation of single mothers. The first measure, Average Monthly Net Deposits 
(AMND), was defined as deposits plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals (withdrawals used 
for non-designated purposes in ADD), divided by the number of months of participation. AMND 
measures net deposits and controls for the length of time that a participant has saved. All else 
constant, greater AMND implies greater saving and asset accumulation in IDAs.  
 
The second measure, the savings rate, was defined as the ratio of AMND to gross monthly 
household income as measured at enrollment in the IDA program. It measures the rate at which 
resource inflows are converted into IDA deposits. This measure is important because it shows 
how much participants save relative to their current income. 
 
Deposit frequency was defined as the number of months with a deposit (excluding deposits of 
interest) divided by the number of months of participation. It shows how steadily a participant 
saves through time  
 
The fourth measure, net deposit as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap, was defined as the 
ratio of AMND to monthly savings target. The monthly savings target is the total match cap (i.e., 
the limit on the amount of deposits that can be matched) divided by the time cap (i.e., the number 
of months after opening an account in which a participant may make matchable deposits). If a 
participant deposited the monthly savings target each month and did not remove any of it as an 
unmatched withdrawal, this level of savings would lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime 
match cap by the end of participation. Therefore, this measure indicates the closeness of actual 
saving behavior to that which would take full advantage of match incentives.  
 
The independent variables of this study included both program related factors (institutional 
factors) and participant characteristics. Program and administrative factors included match rates, 
monthly savings targets, financial education, and measures of program inputs. Participant 
characteristics included their demographic characteristics, education and employment status, 
household income, assets, and whether they were in receipt of AFDC/TANF or not. 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive analyses were conducted to first derive descriptive information of the savings 
outcomes of single mothers. Several multiple regression models were then conducted in which 
each of these dependent variables was regressed on independent variables. Because we are 
particularly interested in how institutional factors influence savings outcomes, the dependent 
variables were first regressed on participant characteristics and then on program characteristics. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents mean values of the four savings measures for single mothers and for all ADD 
participants. On average, single mothers had AMND of $23.2, and this represented 2.2 percent of 
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 their average monthly income. They saved on average 61 percent of their savings target, and the 
mean of deposit frequency was 56 percent (about 7 months out of 12). Compared to ADD 
participants as a whole, single mothers had lower AMND, deposit frequency and net deposit as a 
percentage of the pro-rated match cap, but their savings rate was the same as other participants.  
 
Table 2. Savings Outcomes and Intended Use of Savings of Single Mothers in ADD 
 Single Mothers in 
ADD 
(N=1,215) 
All ADD 
Participants 
(N=2,378) 
Average Monthly Net Deposit ($) 23.2 25.4 
Savings rate (%)  2.2 2.2 
Deposit frequency (%) 56 58 
Net deposit as a percentage of the pro-matched 
savings cap (%)  61 67 
Intended use of savings (%) 
Home Purchase 
Postsecondary Ed. 
Microenterprise 
Home Repair 
Retirement 
Job Training 
 
62 
13 
15 
5 
3 
2 
 
 
53 
16 
19 
6 
4 
2 
 
 
 
Table 2 also presents the intended use of matched withdrawals. Over half of single mothers (62 
percent) reported that they intended to buy a home. Other important intended uses included 
microenterprise (15 percent) and postsecondary education (13 percent). Compared to ADD 
participants as a whole, single mothers were more likely to use matched withdrawals for home 
purchases (62 percent vs. 53 percent) than for all other designated purposes. This may be 
because only 10 percent of single mothers in ADD were homeowners.  
 
Results from Regression Analyses 
Tables 3.1 through 3.3 display the results from the regression analysis on the savings outcomes 
of single mothers. Although presented in three separate tables, for each savings outcome, all the 
results come from a single regression. All these four regression models were statistically 
significant. Independent variables explained 52 percent of the variance in AMND, 47 percent in 
savings rate, 48 percent in deposit frequency, and 66 percent in net deposit as a percentage of the 
pro-rated match cap. In terms of cross-sectional regression analysis, the R2s are quite respectable. 
It should also be noted that institutional variables alone explained most of the variance in these 
models (36 percent, 26 percent, 32 percent, and 53 percent of the variance in the four savings 
outcomes respectively). In the following, important findings regarding the relationship between 
independent variables and savings outcomes are discussed.  
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 Table 3.1. Institutional Characteristics and Savings Outcomes 
 
Average 
Monthly Net 
Deposits 
(AMND) 
Savings 
Rate 
Deposit 
Frequency 
Net deposit 
as a 
percentage of 
pro-rated 
match cap 
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Match rate     
1:1 0.05 0.32 -0.32* 0.18 
2:1 0.30 0.33 -0.34* 0.21 
3:1 1.90 2.38 -0.22 0.31 
4:1 to 7:1     
Monthly savings 
target 0.72* 0.06 0.008** -0.01* 
Hours of financial 
education     
General      
None -13.0 -0.71 -0.64** -1.05 * 
1 to 6 0.86 0.10 0.008 0.04 
7 to 12 2.83** 0.24 0.01 0.05* 
13 to 18 0.006 0.12 -0.02 0.02 
19 or more -0.83 0.08 0.004 -0.03 
Asset-specific      
1 to 6 3.64** 0.23 0.02* 0.06* 
7 to 12 -1.57 -0.02 -0.005 -0.05 
13 to 18 -1.18 -0.23 0.007 -0.009 
19 or more -0.14 -0.05 -0.001 -0.006 
Program inputs per 
participant per month     
Salaried IDA staff 
(hours) -1.74 -0.99 0.03 -0.08 
Partner Staff (hours) 5.61 -0.07 0.08* 0.06 
Volunteer Staff (hours) 4.38 0.48 0.06 0.008 
Salary expenses ($) 0.09 0.06 -0.003 0.007 
Non-salary expenses 
($) -0.49* -0.03 -0.003 -0.01* 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
Match rate 
Institutional theory of savings suggests that match rates are a possible incentive to save 
(Sherraden, Schreiner & Beverly, 2003). Match rates for single mothers varied from 1:1 to 7:1, 
with 2:1 being the most common one (52 percent). Results indicated that single mothers with 
match rates ranging from 4:1 to 7:1 saved more frequently than those with match rates 1:1 or 2:1. 
This shows that higher match rates increase saving efforts.  
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 However, match rates were not associated with the other three savings outcomes. Based on the 
report by Schreiner et al. (2001), there are two possible explanations. First, programs may assign 
higher match rates if they expect their participants to save less. Second, higher match rates are 
also possibly linked with lower match caps in some programs in order to reach a given goal of 
total savings with matches. All these factors may weaken the relationship between match rates 
and amounts of deposits. 
 
Monthly savings target 
Monthly savings target could be a proxy for savings goals (Schreiner et al., 2001). In ADD, 
monthly savings target for single mothers ranged from $11 to $167. Institutional theory suggests 
that higher savings goals may provide incentives for more savings. Monthly savings target was 
positively related to AMND and deposit frequency. For example, a $1 increase in the monthly 
savings target was linked with an increase in AMND of $0.72. It needs to be noted, however, 
that the positive link may be spurious because programs may have set higher targets if they 
expected their participants would save more. Monthly savings target was negatively associated to 
net deposit as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap.  
 
Financial education 
A special feature of IDA programs compared to other subsidized-savings programs is that IDA 
programs require financial education. Financial education in ADD includes financial education 
in general and asset-specific education. The results indicated that each additional hour, in the 
range of 7 to 12 hours, was associated with $2.83 increase in AMND. In the same hours range, 
more hours of education was also positively related to net deposit as a percentage of pro-rated 
match cap. However, general financial education in the range of one to six hours, or above 12 
hours was not linked with savings outcomes. 
 
How can we explain this? The curvilinear relationship between financial education and savings 
outcomes indicates that financial education needs to reach certain hours (7 hours) in order to 
affect the saving behavior of participants. However, more hours (above 12) of education may be 
associated with more complicated content, which participants find difficult to use in the real 
world. 
 
For asset specific education, each additional hour in the range of one to six hours was associated 
with $3.64 increase in AMND. In the same range, more hours of education was also positively 
related to deposit frequency and net deposit as a percentage of pro-rated match cap.  
 
Program inputs 
Program inputs included both staff hours (salaried employees, volunteers and staff in partner 
organizations) and expenses (salary expenses and non-salary expenses). Staff hours were 
measured as average monthly work hours of staff for each participant. The results suggest that 
additional hours worked by partner staff increased the deposit frequency of single mothers. This 
may imply that staff from partner organizations are more familiar with particular issues related to 
savings of single mothers.  
 
Salary (or non-salary) expenses were the average monthly salary (or non-salary and non-match) 
expenses for an IDA program per participant. Results indicate that salary expenses had no 
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 statistically significant link with savings performance of single mothers. A $1 increase in non-
salary expenses, however, was linked with a decrease in AMND of $0.49. Non-salary expenses 
were also negatively associated with net deposit as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap. From 
ADD data, we do not know what exactly these expenses were, and further information is needed 
to solve this puzzle.  
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 Table 3.2. Participant Characteristics and Savings Outcomes 
 Average 
Monthly Net 
Deposits 
(AMND) 
Savings Rate Deposit Frequency 
Net deposit as 
a percentage 
of pro-rated 
match cap 
 Coefficients  Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Age     
0 to 40 years 0.42 0.05 0.0005 0.007 
40 years or more 0.20 0.08 0.004 0.01 
Location of residence     
Population 2,500 or more     
Population less than 2,500 -5.70* -0.68* -0.15 -0.65** 
Marital status     
Widowed 0.71 -0.94 -0.008 0.40 
Divorced or separated 1.97 0.46 -0.08 -0.0006 
Never-married     
Household composition     
Adults (18 or older) 3.15 0.17 0.02 0.21** 
Children  
(17 or younger) 0.11 -0.13 0.03 0.0006 
Race/ethnicity     
Native American 8.83 0.65 0.02 0.14 
African-American -6.87 -0.50 -0.04 -0.06 
Caucasian     
Other 1.74 -0.12 0.02 0.04 
Hispanic -3.15 -0.81 -0.10 -0.04 
Asian-American -3.17 1.16 0.02 -0.03 
Education      
Less than high school     
High school graduates or 
earned GED -7.61 -0.90 0.06 -0.20 
Attended college  -9.17 -0.24 -0.01 -0.21 
Graduated from 2-year 
college -8.75 -0.81 0.06 -0.27 
Graduated college (2-
year/4-year unspecified) -4.16 -0.31 0.05 -0.47** 
Graduated from 4-year 
college 1.67 0.48 0.15 -0.10 
Employment     
Unemployed     
Employed, full-time  -3.09 -0.41 -0.16 -0.43 
Employed, part-time  -6.97 0.26 -0.11 -0.36 
Not working  -8.58 1.31 -0.22 -0.23 
Student, not working -2.61     -0.75   -0.32* -0.60 
 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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 Table 3.3. Income, Assets, Public Assistance, and Savings Outcome 
 Average 
Monthly Net 
Deposits 
(AMND) 
Savings 
Rate 
Deposit 
Frequency 
Net deposit 
as a 
percentage of 
pro-rated 
match cap 
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Household income 
($100/month) 
    
Recurrent income      
0 to $799 0.84 -0.82*** -0.007         0.01 
$800 or more -0.003    -0.01 -0.003  -0.0006 
Intermittent income 0.43 -0.36***  0.006         0.02 
Assets     
Savings account owner        -2.08    -0.70      -0.04        -0.07 
Balance in savings 
account ($100) 
        0.48     0.04       0.003 0.01 
Checking account 
owner 
   8.51**     1.14      -0.07     0.25** 
Balance in Checking 
account ($100) 
        0.27   -0.0003       0.007 0.01 
Home owner 6.54     1.25   0.007 0.15 
Car owner 0.18     0.63        0.02 0.04 
Receipt of public 
assistance 
    
TANF or AFDC never     
TANF or AFDC 
formerly 
    -5.14 (0.18) -0.28 -0.02 (0.57) -0.09 
TANF currently -0.53 (0.95) 0.09 -0.04 (0.64) -0.14 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
Demographic characteristics  
The results (see Table 3.2) indicate that the demographic characteristics of participants and their 
education and employment status have little link to their savings performance. Rural single 
mothers (about 12 percent of ADD single mothers live in rural areas) had lower AMND, savings 
rate and net deposit as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap compared to their urban 
counterparts. Perhaps transaction costs for deposits and withdrawals, (for example, costs related 
to transportation), were higher in rural areas.  
The graduates of 2-year or 4-year colleges had lower net deposits as a percentage of their pro-
rated match cap. In all other cases, education had no effect on savings outcomes. Student single 
mothers saved less frequently compared to unemployed single mothers, possibly because student 
participants had student loans (Schreiner et al., 2001). 
 
Income  
Household income included both recurrent income (wages, government benefits, pensions, and 
investments) and intermittent income (self-employed, child support, gifts, and other sources). 
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 Income was not associated with AMND, savings rates, or net deposit as a percentage of pro-rated 
match cap. However, both recurrent income and intermittent income were linked with decreased 
savings rates. Although we may not exactly know what caused this through the analysis of ADD 
data, the broad message here is that, contrary to the prediction of economic theory, less income 
need not imply less savings in a structured savings program like IDAs (for a detailed analysis, 
see Sherraden, Schriener & Beverly, 2002).  
 
Assets 
ADD single mothers who had checking accounts, on average, had $8.51 higher AMND than 
those without checking accounts. This is possibly because participants with checking accounts 
can reduce transaction costs (Schreiner et al., 2001). Ownership of checking accounts may also 
be positively related to more financial knowledge and experiences, thus increasing savings. 
Ownership of savings accounts, however, was not linked with savings outcomes. This may 
probably be because owning a savings account needs less financial sophistication than owning a 
checking account (Schreiner et al., 2001). The fact that savings were not linked with savings 
outcomes is possibly due to the small amounts in these accounts (maximum amount in checking 
and savings were $55 and $50, respectively). Home ownership and car ownership were not 
associated with savings outcomes. 
 
Receipt of AFDC/TANF 
The results indicate that after controlling for program and participant variables, welfare receipt 
before or at enrollment in IDAs did not significantly affect savings outcomes. Welfare recipiency 
itself, in the absence of asset limits, appears not to be linked with saving performance. This may 
result partially from the fact that savings in IDAs do not count for asset tests for public 
assistance, and IDAs provides institutional supports for savings (for more detailed analysis, see 
Zhan, Sherraden, & Schreiner, 2002). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study examined the savings performance of single mothers in a matched savings program. 
Overall, the results indicate that single mothers can save in IDA programs, and participant 
characteristics, in general, have little impact on their savings outcomes. Interestingly, income of 
single mothers was negatively related to their savings rates, which is contrary to the prediction of 
economic theory. Further analyses indicate that before controlling for the effects of institutional 
factors, intermittent income of single mothers was positively linked with their AMND and net 
deposit as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap. Therefore, institutional factors seem to 
overpower the income impact in ADD. Institutional factors also explained most of the variance 
in four outcome measures. These findings suggest that the institutional support in IDA programs 
may matter more in enhancing the savings of single mothers. Indeed we found that financial 
education (up to a point) and monthly savings target were strongly related to savings outcomes.  
 
Several limitations of this study must be noted. First, due to self-selection and program-selection, 
single mothers in ADD are different, in some aspects, from general low-income single mothers. 
Therefore, the results cannot easily be generalized to all single mothers. Second, although the 
analysis of ADD data indicates that institutional factors may play an important role, we cannot 
fully reveal what kind of institutional characteristics caused savings, or differentiate the effects 
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 of different factors. Further studies that compare savings behaviors of single mothers inside 
IDAs and outside IDAs may help identify these factors. Furthermore, as discussed, possible two-
way causation problems between some program factors and savings outcomes would lead to 
biased results.  
 
Despite these limitations, the results from this study suggest that IDAs or other similar 
subsidized programs may be effective tools to help low-income single mothers save. Two 
implications may be drawn from this study. First, this study indicates that monthly savings 
targets and financial education were positively associated with savings of single mothers. 
Therefore, in order to implement IDA programs more effectively, limits of matchable deposits 
could be raised, and the quality of financial education needs to be ensured. For this purpose, 
federal and state governments may have to generously commit to funding for IDA programs. 
This study also underscores the special need to help rural single mothers save in IDA programs.  
 
Second, public policies that aim to help single mothers save and build assets should be included 
and expanded. For example, in order to make a significant impact in the lives of low-income 
single mothers, IDAs and other subsidized-saving programs need to go to a larger scale. The 
coverage of IDAs programs at this time is quite limited, and reach only a minute portion of low-
income single mothers. Although many states have some types of IDA programs, most of these 
programs are community-based and the total number of IDA participants is probably less than 
20,000 (Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003). IDAs may also be more likely to reach 
economically more competent single mothers due to the screening process. Therefore, it is 
necessary to expand the assets-based policy for poor women with children.  
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